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Abstracts 
This paper aimed at investigating the fragility of banking sectors within the West African 
Monetary Zone and drawing inferences on the implications of the instability (or 
otherwise) of the banking systems for the proposed currency union in West Africa. As a 
matter of relevance and significance, the degree of fragility of the six banking sectors 
within the WAMZ was investigated so as to determine the extent to which this future 
currency union in prone to banking sector-induced financial instability which could bring 
the feasibility and sustainability of the currency union into jeopardy and doubt. Drawing 
from the theoretical underpinnings of probit model, multivariate probit regression 
models of banking sector fragility were constructed for the banking sectors in the 
member countries of the WAMZ. Determinants of the probability of crisis within these 
banking sectors were employed in multivariate probit models specification with annual 
data of these six WAMZ countries spanning over a period of time between 1980 and 2013 
in which event approach was adopted in identifying episodes of banking problems over 
this 14-year period. The study noted the stability (or otherwise) of the Nigerian banking 
sector as paramount, conveying crucial implications for overall banking sector of the 
proposed WAMZ, given the country's banking strength and presence across  the whole 
sub-continent. From the general outcomes of the probability tests of banking fragility 
across the WAMZ, banking systems within the zone portend moderate stability which 
gives assurance of a stable monetary integration of the WAMZ for now. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Background 
Some of the lessons drawn from Eurozone crisis have turned banking sector stability to 
an issue of importance for the existing and future monetary unions.  The important 
question that comes to mind here is about the probability of banking sector fragility in 
member countries of these currency unions. Answers to this question are very crucial in 
determining the failure and otherwise of an existing monetary union as well as the 
feasibility and prospects of currency unions the pipeline. Since banking sector stability 
is pivotal for the stability of financial systems within a monetary union, the fragility of 
banking systems has been a major area of focus in recent research works. This makes 
this study on the fragility of banking systems within the bank-based underdeveloped 
financial systems of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) countries worthy of 
empirical analysis and academic exercise. Banking crisis is one of the three major forms 
of financial crisis. The two others in this category are currency crisis and sovereign debt 
crisis. The WAMZ was made up of The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone. 
Developments from the Eurozone crisis and the need for banking sector stability within 
a monetary union brought crucial lessons for prospective currency union like the WAMZ 
and others. Within a currency union, fragile banking sectors are pivotal for financial instability of such currency union, while strong banking sectors are ‘preventives’ for 
financial instability of prospective and existing currency union. Consequent upon these 
background and Eurozone experience, the menace of banking sector fragility in a 
monetary union cannot be over emphasised. Therefore, the stability (or otherwise) of 
the banking sectors in the WAMZ is a strong factor that could determine how feasible 
and sustainable the WAMZ would be, as a monetary union from the view-point of its 
desired long term stability. 
The major aim of this paper is the investigation of the fragility of banking sectors within 
the WAMZ and draw inferences on the implications of the instability (or otherwise) of 
the banking systems for the proposed currency union in West Africa. As a matter of 
relevance and significance, the degree of fragility of the six banking sectors within the 
WAMZ is investigated so as to determine the extent to which this future currency union 
in prone to banking sector-induced financial instability which could bring the feasibility 
and sustainability of the currency union into jeopardy and doubt. 
2 Overview and Features of African Banking Sectors 
Right from the colonial days up till the late 1990s, the entire African banking sector was 
hugely dominated by banks having European origin. Since the 1980s, banking in the 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has witnessed significant changes with the advent of 
sophisticated banking in many African countries, due to the spread of new technologies. 
Despite the strong growth in the African banking sector, in comparison with other 
continents of the world, banking sectors in SSA are relatively under-developed, just as 
the financial sectors across Africa are under-developed. It is necessary to highlight that 
banking sectors greatly dominate the Africa financial sector (which is generally 
underdeveloped). The banking sectors account for a big share of assets and services of 
the financial sectors. It is evident that banking systems in Africa are small in size 
(absolutely and relatively). As at 2013, total assets of the entire African banking sectors 
was less than US$300 billion (South Africa not included), this an equivalent of about 
one-tenth of the size of Chinese largest bank and about the size of Swedish third largest 
bank.1 Most banks exhibit low loan/deposit ratios while government securities is the greater proportion of banks’ assets. In the SSA as at 2012, South Africa and Nigeria (a 
member of the WAMZ) dominating the African banking sector, reporting 36% and 9% 
respectively in assets while the respective net banking income was 45% and 15%.2 
African banking sector suffers inefficient, small size and low financial intermediation 
and are characterized by low competition, little barrier to entry and exits (causing the 
evident dominance of foreign banks), lowest access to finance (an obstacle to business growth, curtailing the continent’s full economic growth potentials). A large proportion 
of African population is unbanked, thereby making the access to credit by small and 
medium scale enterprises very tight. This banking sector is generally diverse, showing 
high rates of banking concentration and penetration.3The nature of bank lending in the 
SSA is short term with over two-third of bank advances having maturity period of below 
one year. The oligopolistic nature of banking market structures in Africa reflect in the 
high share of total assets of three largest banks Africa; and this put constraints on the 
intensity of banking competition in Africa. (Mlachila et al, 2013). The high degree of 
fragmentation in African banking sector is reflected in the largest banking group in the 
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  Sourced from Lefilleur (2013) 
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 Sourced from Derreumaux (2013) 
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 This is for instance, more than 50% in South Africa  
continent having (as at 2012), total assets of US$17 billion which is equivalent to 
around 33% of the size of the Cypriot largest bank.4 
Branches of banks are concentrated in few urban areas, yet there are high costs of 
banking operations as reflected in high fees and high interest rates spreads across 
Africa banking. Lack of banking innovation, under-performances and inability to 
generate returns of scale are root causes of the lack of the capabilities of making 
banking environments healthy and competitive, while African banking sectors settle for 
banking activities that are of low risks within a market displaying the niche for high 
profitability and which could not have serious impact on the finance of private sectors. 
Due to the under-development of African banking, total credits to private sector revolve 
around just one-fifth of African GDP over past years. Nigeria has six of the seven largest banks in the SSA and this makes Nigeria’s banking sector to be competitive, with the 
ability to offer substantial financial services. Nigeria banks (United Bank for Africa 
(UBA), GT Bank, Zenith Bank, Access Bank) now play dominant roles in the WAMZ 
member countries. 
One other feature of African banking is the co-existence of large and small scale banks. 
Most of these small banks are government-owned. Due to the lack of the drive of the 
regulatory authorities to restructure banking sectors in Africa, these small banks are 
prone to insolvency which could cause the banks to fold up or taken over. Within the 
African banking sector, dominant banks have strongest and influential powers. In a 
study by Honohan and Beck (2007), finding revealed that the banking market share of 
around 73% were held by three banks in the representative African countries samples 
investigated and this is usually around 60% is the other banking markets around the 
world. The stylized feature of banking systems in Africa in evident in the combination of 
some factors: (i) small absolute sizes of banks and the entire banking systems, (ii) low 
level of income, (iii) low financial literacy levels, large informal sectors, (iv) 
infrastructural weaknesses, (v) weak judicial enforcement mechanisms, (vi) weak contractual frameworks for banking activities, (vii)  weak creditors’ rights and (viii) 
political risks (Mlachila et al, 2013).However, across Africa, there are significant 
variances in economic importance of banking as shown by differences in legal codes, 
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laws and regulations, economic sizes, dependence on resources, public policies, history 
and population density. 
Another salient feature of banking sectors in SSA is that banking systems operate 
significantly excessive liquidity which implies the scarcity of creditworthy fund users 
and further consequences of this factor for monetary policies in these countries is the 
effectiveness of policies in serving as instrument that could be applied in influencing 
bank lending, inflation and other monetary variables. The basic funding bases of African 
banking system are domestic economies in which non-residents funding are negligible. 
Viewing this as a demand-side phenomenon, creditworthy borrowers constrain African 
bank lending growth. Nevertheless, African banks will become more viable if they are to 
grow as fast as possible to become major players in financial markets just as the entire 
African economy is growing and moving towards integration, alongside with booms in 
international trade across the continent. 
A look into the history of banking in Africa would reveal that a major cause of banking 
crisis has been poor lending activities of banks which led to deteriorating bank assets 
quality and increase in the size of nonperforming loans of banks. Consequent upon this and other issues raised above, the major worry about African banking is the ‘home-grown risks’ since there were no serious risk-effect of the global economic slow-downs 
and the Eurozone financial crisis on African banking. The degree of this concern/worry 
is high for African countries where the bank portfolio of private sector credit is growing 
rapidly and sustained. Care should be taken so that the combination of poor governance 
and unreliable/inconsistent supervisory responses to developments in finance and 
macro-economy would not lead to full-fledged systemic crisis in Africa banking. This 
could be costly, disruptive and further affect the proposed monetary integration of the 
regional blocks of the African continent (including the WAMZ). Laeven and Valencia 
(2012) could establish that since the eruption of the systemic fragility of banks in the 
1980s and 1990s, African banking sectors have experienced few banking crises. 
However, this does not rule out the possibility of pockets of bank fragilities which could 
be sparked-off or revealed by political crises or deficiencies in governance, though these 
fragilities may be hidden now. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to note that African banking market could not be much 
impacted by the 2008/2009 global financial crisis due to the shallow nature of the 
banking systems in Africa owing to the limited integration of African banking markets 
within global financial markets as well as limited exposure of these banking sectors to ‘toxic assets’. This ‘shallow nature’ enabled the African banking systems to evade the 
direct consequences of the global crisis and survive through the crisis that impacted the 
real sectors of these economies in the form of diminishing FDI and exports.  
Box 1 contains the highlights and explanations of reasons why banking sector in Africa 
may be difficult and challenging: 
Box 1: Why Banking in Africa has been more Challenging 
 Reasons Explanations and Effects 
1 Small sizes of many African 
economies 
* This prevents providers of financial services from taking 
advantage of economies of scale. 
*Greater proportion of the populace are not commercially 
viable bank customers as evident by limited demand for banks' 
products and services - credit, savings, insurance etc. 
* There is cost effectiveness of banking services outside urban 
areas given population dispersion in Africa.   
2 Informal sector operations 
of African economies and 
economic agents 
* Large proportion of the populace are excluded from formal 
banking and financial services and consequently, large 
proportion of economic agents operates in informal sector and 
lack proper documentation that facilitates bank financial 
intermediation. 
* This causes risks and costs of banking in Africa to be on the 
increase. 
3 Governance problem * Bad quality of corporate governance in African plagues 
banking institutions in the continent; 
* This undermines the provision of banking and financial 
services, reforms and the intervention of government in 
attending to financial market failure. 
4 Volatilities in African 
banking 
* Volatilities take the aggregate forms of wars, social and 
political unrests, epidemics and large swing nature of primary 
commodity prices on which many African economies depend. 
* Inconsistency and fluctuations in income streams of 
households and small businesses are the nature of individual 
volatilities. 
* These all increase cost of banking services as a well as 
undermine the management of risks within the banking sector. 
 Source: Author's explanations and Beck and Cull (2013) 
Banking sectors in the WAMZ six member countries are predominantly made up of 
domestic banks as well as pan-African banks. As characterised by the banking systems 
across the SSA, banking the WAMZ is generally under-developed and concentrated, 
exhibiting low degree of competition in spite of low level of entry barrier in the African 
banking world. Practices and features of banking systems in the WAMZ are reflections 
of obtain across African banking sectors. The breakdown of the number of commercial 
banks in the WAMZ as at the end of 2018, is as shown in Table 1 below: 
Table 1 Number Licensed Banks in the WAMZ's Countries 
WAMZ Country Number of Banks 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
14 
23 
15 
9 
22 
13 
   Source: Author’s compilation 
The banking sectors in the six countries consist of big domestic commercial banks, international banks’ subsidiaries or branches (pan-African banks) and small 
(microfinance) banks. 
3 Theoretical Background to Banking Sector Fragility 
Banking sector fragility is about the riskiness of the banking system. For a monetary 
union, financial system stability is of paramount importance. This is due to the effects of 
the high degree of interrelationships of the components of a financial system and the 
contagion effect of financial crisis on the stability of the economies of member states of 
the currency union. If literature has established that banking sector is the dominant 
sector of many financial systems, therefore, the stability of the sector is greatly crucial 
for economic stability in particular, of developing economies where there are strong 
links between the financial systems and the macro economy. For monetary unions, this 
is specifically a reason why the study of banking system vulnerability and fragility is of 
great relevance towards revealing the stability of the banking sector as well as exposing 
and analysing early signs of banking crisis given the lessons put to the fore by the 
Eurozone crisis. 
Banking system impacts economic growth and business cycles. For an economy, a stable 
and strong banking system propels future growth in GDP and enhances the 
performance of the economy. It is suffice to state that the causal link between banking 
sector stability and economic growth is not unidirectional. Positive functioning and 
sound performances of an economy impacts the state of the banking sector; hence, 
banking system fragility may be the consequence of weak and poor macroeconomic 
conditions and weaknesses in structural characteristics. Owing to the manifestation of 
some varied systemic risks within the financial system, it is essential to highlight that 
there is a strong association between banking fragility and high inflation rate, low 
growth rate of GDP and high real exchange rate. Furthermore, the banking system could 
be impaired if the financial condition of the borrowers move from bad to worse. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) are of the view that poor economic growth and 
loss of monetary control had many times, been precursors of banking crises. On the 
other hand, if banks are highly liquid, well capitalised and operate within a baking 
system where the degree of competition is high, the incidence of banking sector fragility 
would be minimal. 
Banking fragility could be determined by the assessment of total asset/equity ratio 
which indicates the degree of decline in the asset value of a bank before equity can be 
wiped off and the bank become insolvent. One further way of capturing bank fragility is 
to calculate for a bank, the liquidity mismatch index (LMI) that measures the mismatch 
between market liquidity of the bank's assets (which is the ease at which bank's assets 
could be exchanged for cash) and funding liquidity of the bank's liabilities (which is the 
ease at which the bank is instantly able to meet the claims of its creditors). There could 
be bank runs, usually due to maturity mismatch of bank's liabilities and assets, leading 
to panics among bank depositors when they felt that the banks may not have liquid 
resources that are sufficient enough to meet requests by all depositors. The LMI reflects 
the degree of shortage of fund (in currency units) towards meeting the claims of the 
creditors. It gives the picture of the amount of fund obtainable by a bank at a particular 
time in excess of what is needed to meet creditors' claims. LMI may be positive or 
negative. A negative LMI portends huge difficulties in raising funds to meet claims by 
creditors. 
Banking sector vulnerability may in general originate from: (i) inability of banks within the sector to play the traditional financial intermediation roles; (ii) economic agents’ 
loss of confidence in the banking system; and (iii) the spread of the banking sector 
vulnerability to the financial system and the economy at large. This is the general notion 
of banking sector vulnerability. If individual banks within an economy are weak, the 
aggregation of this is the weakness of the entire banking sector which may further be 
aggregated by some negative externalities. 
There are two different viewpoints to bank fragility. These are the asset viewpoint and 
the liability viewpoint. Deterioration in the quality of bank's loan assets and bank runs 
are the respective examples of asset and liquidity sides of bank fragility. When there 
two fragility viewpoints are combined, a banking sector is prone to fragility; this would 
then be on the event of precarious situations like the non-performing loan asset/total 
loan ratio exceeding an appropriate threshold of, say 10% (asset side); banking sector 
rescue operation cost of at least, 2% of GDP (asset side); bank runs (liability side) and 
other emergency measure taken by government (like deposit freezing, generalised 
deposit guarantees, prolonged bank holidays etc (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
2005).  History of banking sector crisis has shown that as consequences of banks’ core functions 
within an economy, banks are fragile financial institutions and are consequently 
vulnerable to instability. Features and characteristics of banking play significant roles in 
the fragility of the banking system. Some of these features are capital adequacy, asset 
quality, efficiency of management, profitability, liquidity, competition, liabilities/assets 
maturity transformation, diversification, among others. Well capitalised banks 
operating within a country or a currency area reduce the possibility of the contagion 
effects of bank failure on such country's banking system, as well as on member 
economies of the currency union. Good level of liquidity buffers liquidity shock while 
enhancing stability of the banking sector at national and regional/monetary union's 
levels. Liabilities-assets maturity transformation is core, as maturity mismatch would 
signal bank fragility. High levels of bad loans (non-performing loans) as percentage of 
the total loans are at the centre of the measurement of bank fragility. Studies have 
revealed positive correlation between low bank concentration in the banking system 
and systemic banking crises; this indicating that large scale diversification of banks 
assists explains the positive link between stability and concentration within banking 
systems. The effect of the presence of foreign banks within a banking system (which 
stimulates competition as well as banking efficiency within the domestic banking 
sector) is another factor that has positive effect on the stability of banking sectors. 
However, in spite of this benefit, foreign banks may be sources of cross-border 
contagion transmitting shocks from one financial system to the other. The matrix below 
expresses the interrelationship between macroeconomic shock and banking sector 
fragility: 
 
Box 1: Matrix of Fragility and Shock 
 Weak Shock Strong Shock 
Low Bank Fragility Unlikely Possible 
High Bank Fragility Possible Likely 
   
This interactions basically express the probability of banking crisis. For instance, when 
the degree of fragility in a banking sector is high, a weak macroeconomic shock could be 
enough to spark-off a banking crisis. Further explanation is that banking crisis manifests 
when there is a high degree of defaults in the corporate and financial sectors of the 
country, and financial institutions and firms are having great difficulties in timely 
repayment credit contracts. This results in sharp increases in non-performing loans 
causing most capital of the aggregate banking system to be exhausted. Sharp increase in 
the real interest rate reversal/slowdown in capital flows and depressed assets price on 
the heels of run-ups preceding the crisis may all accompany the situation. Deposit runs 
on banks triggers bank crisis in some cases but in most cases, the general realisation is 
that there are distresses in systematically important financial institutions. Systemic 
banking crisis occurs when there is a significant number of defaults within the financial 
and banking industry of a country, and financial entities face difficulties in fulfilling 
financial contracts as at when due (Laven and Valencia, 2010).  
Box 2 below expresses the common measures/variables of crisis in the financial sector 
with specific reference to the banking sector; it also indicates what these variables 
measure as well as what they signal: 
Box 2: Variables of Banking Crisis and Implications 
Variables Measuring Implications 
(i) Growth in bank 
credit 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii)Non-performing 
loans (NPL) 
 
(iii) Bank leverage 
ratio 
The degree of riskiness and 
fragility of banking sector 
(i) Rapid growth in bank credit portfolio 
in associated with decline in standard or 
rather results in poor loan standard and 
subsequently, greater risk for the 
banking system. 
 
(ii)Higher NPL/GDP ratio depicts higher 
cost of banking crisis to the economy. 
 
(iii) High loan losses, high risk premium 
and high bank leverage ratio in excess 
are precursors of banking crisis. 
Capital adequacy 
ratio 
The cushion power and size of 
banks' capital in handling 
unexpected (and expected) 
losses. 
Low capotal adequacy ratio (in excess) 
points to possible future banking crisis. 
Liquidity ratio Available short term fund at 
disposal for the purpose of 
meeting short term obligations. 
Systemic banking crisis can erupt if this 
ratio is excessively low.  
In the analysis of the causes of banking fragility, literature on banking theory had 
largely ignored the perceived multifaceted and complex association between 
competition in the banking sector and bank fragility. Explanations of the relationship 
have brought two assumptions to the fore that: (a) bank competition enhances bank 
fragility (competition fragility); (b) bank competition enhances stability (competition 
stability). The assumption of competition fragility is in the argument that bank fragility 
emanates from banks' risky activities of competing for deposits, deregulation of banking 
as well as other risky acts of banks. The analysis is associated with 'competition 
stability' which is about the view that the reduction in information asymmetries and/or 
increase in liquidity within interbank markets are factors causing bank competition that 
will promote bank stability. However, some empirical studies are able to establish the 
ambiguities in the bank concentration and bank fragility relationships as there is the 
argument that while there is higher risk of banking crisis in the less competitive 
banking system (an in countries characterised by less developed legal system), risk of 
bank fragility is less when the degree of bank concentration is high within a banking 
system. It is important to mention that the general suggestion among economists is of 
the positive and strong correlation between market structures and banking sector 
fragility when and if there is information asymmetries. 
It is therefore important to consider the impact of market structures on the fragility of 
banking sectors. When the market powers of banks are hampered by competition 
(competition fragility),5 the profit and margins are reduced. This thus leads to fragility 
when banks are prompted to embark on taking more risks in order to make-up for the 
resultant losses so as to enhance the level of operating incomes. The general consensus 
is that when competition in the credit market is intense, banks may be prompted to take 
on bad risk whenever they offer credit terms that sharply deviate from borrowers' risk 
profile and/or bank's credit policy.6Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) got empirical evidence 
to infer that there could be bank fragility when high interest rates on lending are 
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6
 This is particularly applicable in the case of loans conditioned on non-risk-adjusted pricing' which would 
generate income that is not associated with the lending risks involved. Despite the arguments in favour of the 
position that banks' excessive risk-taking are caused by competitive factors within the banking sector, many 
opinions were against the view. 
 
applied and loan repayment becomes difficult as the aftermath would be increases in 
moral hazard and borrowers being encouraged to undertake projects with higher 
degree of risks. One other view highlighted in the study is that the increase in the 
banking sector excessive risk, which consequently raises the probability of bank 
fragility in the banking sector, stems from low competition in the credit market. But 
when credit market competition is high, this tends to reduce the lending rate paid by 
borrowers (firms) and as well as reduces their incentives to take on risky projects 
because of the increase in their own returns (profits).  
In developing economies, as already indicated, the banking sector serves as the 
dominant sector and the most important link within the financial system. This is 
because bank financing is the most requested form of financing in countries that fall in 
this category. The consequence of bank fragility (or bank failure) would be very harmful 
and catastrophic on the finance of trade, businesses and investment projects and on the 
aggregate economic activities. There could also be systemic failure manifesting as 
consequences of contagious bank collapse. There are negative impacts of a weak 
banking system on the macro economy; and from the opposite direction, the well-
functioning of a bank could be impaired by faulty macro economy. This bi-directional 
effects could be more pronounced in developing economies where the financial 
intermediation roles of banks is crucial and important in the development of the private 
sectors and the restraining of  the multiplier effect of savings on output growth. As 
witnessed in the Eurozone (and other regions), financial crisis saturated the banking 
sector as reflected in increased credit default risks, reduced customers' confidence in 
the banking sector and risks aversion by banks. The strength of the banking sectors of 
the developing economies of the WAMZ is therefore very crucial to the success of the 
proposed currency union. This is because of the overwhelming fiscal, monetary and 
economic costs of banking crisis which might not be affordable. 
 
 
 
 
Generally and specifically in the WAMZ, banks are opened to various forms of risks 
(which are indicators of fragility in banking) as indicated in Box 3: 
Box 3:Risks Indicators of Banking Sectors Fragility opened to the WAMZ Countries 
Risk Indicators Implications 
Liquidity Risk 
 
* may be caused by sudden and unexpected loss of confidence of banks' 
depositors; 
* may lead to runs on banks, depleting the liquidity levels; 
*may be due to information asymmetry between banks, depositor and 
borrower and maturity transformation in which banks' invest short term 
deposits (liabilities) in long term loans (asset), leading to bank runs when 
the level of the available short term investment is lower than the total 
value of withdrawal requests; 
* the rush in bank runs would generate panics which may induce banking 
crisis. 
Credit (Default) 
Risk 
* may arise when bank debtors find it difficult to continue to honour their 
commitments (principal and interest) to banks, which may be due to losses 
leading to insolvencies of firms and bankruptcies.  
Market Risk Market risks are risks caused by loss of standing and position of the 
banking system due to factors that are external to banks and the banking 
sector. 
*Interest rate risks - may be caused by adverse interest rate changes in 
intermediation operations (when there are different rate references for 
loans and debt) and financial market operations (interest risks taken on 
the basis of anticipation of the bank involved). 
*Exchange rate risks - may be caused by adverse fluctuations in exchange 
rate when bank transactions are denominated in two currency. This is 
more pronounced in times of high volatilities of these currencies. 
*Commodity price risk - may be caused by adverse movements in prices of 
primary commodities. (This is of high significance in West Africa).  
Operations Risk *may be evident by poor internal controls and dysfunction in the banking 
system; 
*may be associated with risk of loss (direct or indirect) emanating from 
inadequacies or failure in people, procedures, internal system (or external 
events), banks' inefficient resources management. 
Solvency Risks *may be an easy consequence of liquidity risk; 
*usually implies the inability of the bank to pay its obligations when they 
fall due without causing interruptions to the operations and activities of 
the bank; 
*may be occur if in a bank's balance problem situation when the existing 
total assets are lower than current liabilities (causing the inability of the 
bank to pay its debts). 
*it is associated with liquidation or cessation of banking 
operations/activities. 
Further to the risk indicators in Box 2, there are some banking system characteristics 
that may have some African-specific influence banking sector fragility (stability) in the 
WAMZ; and these are expressed in Box 3: 
 
 
 
Characteristics Details and Effects 
The extent of liquidity 
of banks in the WAMZ  
*This is about the maintenance of adequate level of liquidity by 
individual national banks is necessary within the proposed currency 
union. This is due to the role and purpose of liquidity as the first line 
of defence against liquidity shocks that may be experienced. 
*Adequate liquidity level enables banks to absorb liquidity shocks 
that may face banking systems at national levels, prevent possible 
contagion and further enhance the stability of the entire currency 
union banking sectors, thereby prevent possible crisis and eventual 
collapse of the monetary union. 
The level of 
capitalisation of banks 
in the WAMZ 
*If a higher level of capital bases of national banks is a strong cushion 
against insolvency, a well-capitalised bank would therefore depict a 
higher degree of banking system stability, reduce the possible effects 
of individual bank distress (at national levels) on the currency 
union's banking sectors as a whole. 
*Many empirical studies have established that increase in the level of 
bank capitalisation has effects on the reduction in the incidence of 
bank fragility.  
The degree of 
concentration of banks 
and competition among 
banks in the WAMZ 
*There is complexity in the correlation between the degree of 
banking competition and bank fragility. 
*According to the Competition-Fragility Hypothesis, market power is 
eroded by banking competition and this may lead to excessive risks 
taking by banks. 
*On the other hand, Competition-Stability Hypothesis posits that 
market power is increased when banks take excessive on risks due to 
exacerbating level of moral hazard as higher interest rate are charged 
on loans. 
* Bank concentration takes the form of few big banks taking on more 
risks while hinging on the belief that they are too-strong-to-collapse. 
* In the WAMZ, increased competition is necessary for the stability of 
banking systems.  
The extent of 
diversification of the 
operations/activities of 
banks in the WAMZ 
* The stability of the banking sector could either improve or 
deteriorate when activities of banks at national levels are diversified. 
There have been mixed views and opinions about this, given the 
various evidence and conclusions in many related empirical studies. 
* However, there is an argument that systemic banking risk could be 
reduced if banks specialise in traditional banking activities.  
* On the contrary, further argument posits that because banks 
diversify, the likelihood of systemic risk may increase within a 
financial system even if such diversification causes reduction in 
individual bank's risk status. 
The degree of co-
existence of domestic 
banks with foreign 
banks 
* The impact of the presence of foreign banks on bank fragility takes 
many opposing forms. Firstly, foreign banks' presence could cause 
high-level banking competition and increased efficiency within the 
national banking systems. 
* There is empirical evidence to support the view that when a foreign 
banks having their headquarters in advanced country operate in host 
country characterised  by relatively weak regulations, such foreign 
banks tend to improve in performances.  
* Secondly, there may be cross-border contagion drawn from the 
operations of foreign banks which could transmit shock across 
borders.  
* The strong overall position is that even as foreign banks may 
import negative shocks into a domestic banking sector, thus 
increasing the risk of fragility in the WAMZ, these foreign banks may 
contribute positively to financial stability in situation of any 
domestic-oriented banking crisis in the proposed currency union. 
 
The financial crisis of 2007/2009 and the Eurozone crisis have been able to reveal that 
banking sector fragility at national levels could affect the national financial systems as 
well as those of the countries in the same region or in the same monetary union, 
through rapid-moving contagion effects of cross-border linkages and common exposure 
which could cause for concern about banking system instability and the accompanying 
impacts at these aggregate regional and/or monetary union levels. It is apparent that 
the implications of the globalisation of banking conjectures that a shock affecting a 
domestic bank (at national levels) could have ripple effects not only on the domestic 
financial system but economies and financial systems of other countries.  Banking sector 
contagion is more drastic and crucial than contagion in the other sectors of the economy 
for some observations identified by Kaufman (1994) cited by Raoudha (2014): (a) 
contagion is more widely distributed within the banking system; (b) contagion occurs 
rapidly and spread beyond the banking sector up to other sectors of the economy as 
well as other countries and could this lead to many other catastrophic failures and 
significant losses to bank depositors. Box 8.5 highlights some possible sources of inter-
banking sector contagion in the WAMZ, a proposed currency union.  
Box 5: Possible Sources of Inter-banking Sector Contagion in the WAMZ 
(i) Shortage of bank liquidity within the proposed currency union: This could be made 
possible if banks in various banking sector place high hope and confidence on the strength of 
interbank markets to absorb temporary liquidity shocks; and due to this reliance on the 
interbank ability, banks would be prompted to cut liquid asset investment. This could create 
difficulties if the aggregate liquidity in inadequate. This could also lead banks to avoid 
liquidating their assets in the long run, but liquidate claims on other banks operating in the 
currency union. This can thereby bring about contagious effect of liquidity problems across the 
WAMZ. 
(ii) Externalities: Bank run by depositors lead to panics in the banking sector. Out of fear, this 
could lead depositors of other banks to decide to withdraw their deposits from all banks within 
the currency union on large scale, thus causing another form of liquidity issue within the 
WAMZ. 
(iii) Domino effect: This could be caused by insolvency of bank which in turn, would affect all 
individuals, institutions and firms associated with such insolvent bank. This could threaten 
confidence in the banking markets with the WAMZ and the contagion would be greatly 
pronounced by interbank direct linkages. 
 Source: Author's explanations and Raoudha (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Data and Methods 
This research study takes cognisance of the nature of the economic and banking 
environments of the WAMZ countries and the extent to which these can breed banking 
sector instability and cause systemic banking crisis within the entire banking sector of 
the future currency union. The determinants of the probability of crisis within these 
banking sectors are employed in a multivariate probit model specification with annual 
data of these six WAMZ countries. These are the crucial factors in sourcing data for this 
study spanning over a period of time between 1980 and 2013 in which event approach 
was adopted in identifying episodes of banking problems during this period. 
Data availability and the macroeconomic theory of banking and banking fragility serve 
as factors in the determination of the predictors and binary dependent variables in the 
probit model for which all necessary data were sourced for the six WAMZ countries, 
over the period covered by study. The following annual data were sourced for the six 
WAMZ countries: real GDP growth, GDP deflator (inflation), nominal exchange rate, 
private credit/deposit ratio, deposit liabilities/GDP ratio, bank credit to private 
sector/GDP ratio, capital adequacy ratio, gross foreign liabilities/GDP ratio, primary 
commodity price shock, real interest rate, real per capita income, budget surplus/GDP 
ratio, M2/foreign reserve ratio, aggregate bank liabilities, aggregate bank assets and 
non-performing loan(NPL)/total assets ratio and Z-score. There is a case in favour of 
macroeconomic variables because these variables may more likely lead to banking crisis 
as banks choose to settle for risky loan portfolio which would increase the share of 
nonperforming loans. Macroeconomic shocks are therefore captured by GDP growth 
rate, real short term interest rate, inflation rate, commodity price, real per capita 
income, M2/foreign reserve ratio, nominal exchange rate depreciation, budget 
balance/GDP ratio among others.   
As appropriate, some of the data were processed further for annual change while capital 
adequacy ratio,  non-performing loan(NPL)/total assets ratio, bank credit to private 
sector/GDP ratio, aggregate bank liabilities and aggregate bank assets in order to yield 
the binary dependent variable given the specified threshold levels. Box 6 below shows 
the predictors and the explanation of the justification of their use in this study: 
 
 Box 6: Explanatory Variables and Justification 
 Variable Justification 
1 Real GDP growth This is about economic growth. The impact of economic growth on 
ability of bank borrowers to repay their debts can be transferred to 
the banking system's credit quality. This is more pronounced in 
developing economies (like the WAMZ member economies) in 
which low levels of economic diversification cause the 
concentration of the exposure of banks within the system in a way 
that there could be systemic crisis arising from shocks to the sector 
that dominate the economy (like banking sector in developing 
economies). This controls for macroeconomic factors that may 
affect banks' assets quality and profitability. 
2 Inflation - GDP deflator If high level of inflation bloats the financial sector through excessive 
liquidity, the balance sheets of institutions within the financial 
sector would harm inflation stabilisation expectations which raises 
the probability of banking crisis. Overblown financial institutions 
would benefit from 'float on payment'; and where there is drastic 
reduction in inflation rates, banks' main sources of revenue are 
blocked and banking sector problems results.7 Furthermore, 
banking sector crisis is very likely when real economy activities, 
caused by decline in real economic activities due to inflationary 
volatility. High rates of inflation may imply an indication of 
mismanagement of the economy which raises the probability of 
banking sector crisis through some channels. However, inflation 
rate is considered to be associated with high nominal interest rate. 
Inflation is related to macroeconomic instability which affects the 
real return on asset, discourages savings, encourages borrowings 
and hence increases the probability of banking sector crisis. 
Logarithmic transformation of inflation may be necessary so as to 
smooth out larger changes in inflation rates which is common in 
developing and transition countries. This serves as control for 
macroeconomic factors that may affect banks' assets quality and 
profitability. 
3 Nominal exchange rate 
depreciation 
This controls for international forces influencing bank vulnerability. 
Exchange rate depreciation is destabilising if and when a banking 
sector is intensively exposed to foreign exchange risks. This tests 
the conjecture that exposure to excessive foreign exchange risks by 
the banking system or bank customers (borrowers) is a propelling 
force of banking crisis. 
4 Change in private 
credit/deposit ratio 
This relates to the liquidity position of banks. If this ratio is high, the 
capacity of banking system to withstand bank runs would be 
minimal and thus increases the likelihood of bank fragility. This also 
proxies for financial liberalisation. 
5 Change in deposit 
liabilities/GDP ratio 
This reflects the loss of confidence in the banking system as 
depicted by the existence of bank deposit runs. It also indicates the 
extent to which banks' balance sheets have shrink for some other 
reasons.  
6 Change in private 
credit/GDP ratio  
If this ratio is growing, it means the banking sector is well extended 
and this increases the probability of banking crisis. This triggers 
banking fragility through system-wide deterioration in asset quality 
or reduction in liquidity when funding sources are volatile. If credit 
growth is excessive, banking instability can emanate through 
deteriorating assets quality and/or when there is reduction in 
liquidity (particularly, if the source of funding is volatile). 
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7 Change in gross foreign 
liabilities/GDP ratio 
This measure the extent to which the banking system relies on 
foreign capital inflows to fund banking operations. This proxies for 
banking fragility arising from being vulnerable to sudden cessation 
of foreign capital inflows. 
8 Short term real interest 
rate 
This is estimated as nominal interest rate minus the 
contemporaneous rate of inflation. High real interest rate is a 
further harm to highly indebted bank customers (firms and 
households); and this affects banks' balance sheets in that lending 
rate could not be increased rapidly. This controls for 
macroeconomic factors that may affect banks' assets quality and 
profitability. This is a form of control for macroeconomic factors 
that may affect banks' assets quality and profitability. 
9 Real per capita income This controls for the level of economic development of the 
developing WAMZ countries 
10 Budget surplus/GDP ratio Huge government budget deficits prevents financial liberalisation. 
This ratio shows the central government's financial needs. The 
inclusion of the ratio is justified because a government that is 
'strapped' for fund would be unable to bring up measures that 
would eventually support strengthening banks' balance sheets. 
Furthermore, the lack of control of budget deficit hugely obstructs 
successes of financial liberalisation, and when financial 
liberalisation is thwarted, there would be problems created for the 
banking sector.8 Even if government is willing to intervene in 
situations banking problems in spite of the budgetary problems, 
public may think that such intervention is not possible, this leading 
to bank runs which compounds and transforms the initial problem 
to a full crisis.9 
11 M2/International reserve 
ratio 
This controls for international forces influencing bank vulnerability. 
The ratio indicates the extent to which the economy is able to 
withstand reversals of capital inflow, particularly in a pegged 
exchange rate regime. Banking sectors have higher probability of 
plunging into crisis when this rate is high, with higher 
consequences of capital outflow vulnerability. This also predicts the 
vulnerability to of an economy to balance of payments crisis. 
12 Private credit/GDP ratio This portrays banking system liquidity position. The capacity of the 
banking system to withstand deposit withdrawal is low (and hence 
the high possibility of banking crisis) when/if this ratio is high. This 
is crucial for banking sectors of developing economies (like the 
WAMZ) that demonstrate high degree of deposit turnover and 
limited (or lack of) alternative funding sources. 
 Drawing from the theoretical underpinnings of probit model, a multivariate probit 
regression model of banking sector fragility is constructed for the banking sectors in the 
member countries of the WAMZ. The probit model will determine a causal relationship 
the discrete probability of 'bank fragility' or 'no bank fragility' and a set of explanatory 
variables that are considered necessary before the probability of any of the two discrete 
events in the WAMZ member countries can take place. In a nutshell, the estimation of 
the probit models would give the expected probability of failure (bank fragility) in order 
to distinguish the WAMZ member countries according to the extent of risk factors in an 
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assessment of the stability of the feasibility of the proposed currency union in the West 
African sub-continent. 
Due to some problems inherent in some of the methods in determining banking sector 
fragility (signal approach, stability index etc), probit econometric method is one of the 
approaches that address these problems. In this approach to the assessment of the 
covariates of banking crisis, the probability of banking sector fragility is assumed to be a 
function of a vector of explanatory variables. In the probit model fitted to the data, 
estimate of banking crisis probability is derived through the MLE function, leading to 
estimated probability of banking sector fragility in the information yielded by the 
predictors in the model.  
In the probit model for the WAMZ countries, the dependent variable has a value of zero 
(0) for 'no banking crisis' years and takes the value of one (1) for each year of 'banking 
crisis'. The dependent variable is thus expressed as:  
𝑦∗ =  { 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠     0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 
There are many postulated definitions and explanations of banking system fragility and 
banking stability in extant literature. Apart from adapting the 'banking crisis dummy' 
definition of banking systemic crisis (as published by the IMF) for the evaluation of 
banking stability in the WAMZ, this study put forward five other definitions of banking 
system fragility and stability status in the proposed currency area as: 
a. 'fragile' when its Bank Capital/Assets Ratio is below threshold of 8% (the Basel II 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) benchmark of the Bank for International 
Settlement); and 'stable' if otherwise;  
b. 'fragile' when its Non-performing Loan/Gross Loan Ratio is above the 3-WAMZ 
country average of 17.21 plus 2 standard deviation threshold over the periods of 
banking system stability reported by the IMF; and 'stable' if otherwise;  
c. 'fragile' when its Bank Credit/Deposit Ratio is above the WAMZ countries' zonal 
average of 59.20 plus 2 standard deviation threshold over the periods of banking 
system stability reported by the IMF; and stable if otherwise; 
d. 'fragile' when its Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets Ratio is below the 4-WAMZ 
country average of 17.05 less 2 standard deviation threshold over the periods of 
banking system stability reported by the IMF; and 'stable' if otherwise; 
e. 'fragile' when its Z score is below the threshold of 2.0 (the mid-point between the 
extremes of the Altman Z Score Model's Grey Zone of Discrimination); and 
'stable' if otherwise.  
In the first instance of banking fragility/stability applied in the research, there were 
four factors taken into cognisance in generating the banking crisis dummies.10 These are 
instances when: (i) the non-performing loan/total asset of a banking system exceeded 
10%; (ii) the cost of a banking system's rescue operation was more than 2% of the GDP; 
(iii) banking sector problems caused large scale nationalisation of banks; (iv) there 
were extensive bank runs, emergency measures decision-taking and general deposit 
insurance policy introduced.11  
In the second instance of banking fragility/stability applying the ratio bank 
capital/asset ratio, adequate capital for banks speaks volume about the health and the 
extent of robustness of banks within the WAMZ toward absorbing or withstanding 
shocks to balance sheets. The dependent variable in this instance is expressed as: 
𝑦∗ = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 < 8% 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝐼𝑆  0 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 > 8% 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝐼𝑆  
In the third instance of banking fragility/stability employing the asset quality ratio of 
non-performing loan/gross loan (NPL), it is assumed that credit risk or asset quality is a 
major determinant of banking sector stability and fragility in the WAMZ. In this 
instance, the dependent variable is expressed as: 
𝑦∗ = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 > average of 17.21 plus 2 standard deviation  0 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 < average of 17.21 plus 2 standard deviation  
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The fourth instance of banking fragility/stability applying the bank liquidity ratio of 
bank credit/deposit, bank liquidity is assumed a determinant of banking sector stability. 
In this market risk instance, banking crisis is strongly hypothesised to be preceded by 
decline in loan standards which always result in the volume of bank loan surpassing the 
volume of bank deposits. Here, the dependent variable is expressed as: 
𝑦∗ = { 
 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 > average of 59.20 plus 2 standard deviation  0 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 < average of 59.20 plus 2 standard deviation  
Another measure of bank liquidity applied in this work is the ratio of bank liquid 
reserves/assets. This fifth instance relates to when a banking crisis is a situation in 
which the value of aggregate banking sector liabilities is greater than the value of 
aggregate banking sector assets. Here, banking crisis is strongly hypothesised to be 
indicated by preceded by the volume of bank liquid reserves falling below the volume of 
bank quick assets. In this case, we express the binary dependent variable as: 𝑦∗
= {1 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 < average of 17.05 plus 2 standard deviation  0 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 > average of 17.05 plus 2 standard deviation  
In the sixth instance of banking fragility/stability, solvency/distance-to-default of the 
WAMZ banking systems are considered applying the probability of default Z Scores of 
the banking systems. The binary dependent variable in this instance is expressed as: 
𝑦∗ = {1 𝑖𝑓  𝑍 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 < 2.0  0 𝑖𝑓 𝑍 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 > 2.0  
In the five banking crisis situations in the study, the threshold values for the 
determination of the binary dependent variable are established such that when these 
thresholds are cross (towards the indicated direction) they signal a banking crisis year.  
Many literature on currency/banking crises are able to conclude that the dynamic 
model in which lagged binary dependent variable is included outperforms other 
specifications (static probit model, Markov- switching models etc) for in-sample and 
out-of-sample forecasts. This has an implication that dynamic specifications are the 
ultimate for modelling early warning signs (EWS) of banking sector fragility. In 
determining systemic banking risks, it is therefore more appropriate to employ the use 
of dynamic model so that all risk factors are revealed ahead of time 𝑡. The dynamic 
structure indicates that the banking risks factors are in advance known 𝑘 period. What 
this means is that the banking sector fragility probability in period 𝑡 is conditional on 
information that are know at time 𝑡 − 𝑘. This is necessary in giving time for reaction 
against the warning signal. Consequently, the dynamic probit model would enable 
efficient use of macroeconomic and banking sector information in the panel data in the 
estimation of probabilities of impending banking sector crises in the WAMZ as a 
prospective currency union, thereby yielding the prediction of the probability of the 
occurrence of a binary variable. Therefore, the application of the population-averaged 
dynamic probit estimator would reveal the probability of banking sector fragility 
through the analysis of the parameter estimates obtained from the probit regressions 
and marginal effects. These are all about the construction of the probability of banking 
sector fragility. However, due to data-availability related problems, this empirical 
analysis applies an unbalance panel of annual data of the six countries (The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) involved, spanning over a maximum 
period of time between 1980 and 2013 as applicable.  
This chapter of the thesis therefore consider the application of a dynamic panel probit 
model of EWS based on exact MLE for forecast banking sector instability in the WAMZ 
countries. All explanatory variables in the dynamic probit model are lagged by one or 
more period in order to avoid the potential problem endogeneity problems in the 
contemporaneous explanatory variables and make explanatory variables to be leading 
indicators in banking sector fragility prediction. This method addresses the exogenous 
(relating to macroeconomic variables) and endogenous crisis persistence problems 
which are not apparent in the static probit model. One of the ways through which the 
endogenous dynamics of crisis could be handled is the inclusion of lagged binary crisis 
variable. This makes the effect of the explanatory variable to depend on the value of 
lagged binary variable which is the previous state of the economy. Secondly, the lagged 
value of the macroeconomic crisis indicator would be linearly added to the right hand 
side of the model. This gives room for richer dynamics in the process of crisis forecasts. 
It also makes the estimation of banking sector fragility signs to rely on an 
autoregressive model in which the lagged value of crisis variable gives the summary of 
all past information within the system. Thirdly, the first and the second methods of 
dynamic could be incorporated simultaneously.  
In estimating the parametric EWS for the WAMZ countries, this research work applies 
these three solutions that address the problem of endogenous persistence of banking 
sector crisis by incorporating the extension into the general specifications of the 
dynamic probit model. These model specifications allow for the presence of past 
banking sector variables as well as the exogenous crisis persistence macroeconomic 
variables (standing for economic policies) of the WAMZ countries. The time series 
framework in this study is extended to a random effect dynamic probit panel analyses. 
Essentially, in consideration of the time series version of the dynamic binary choice 
model, the one-step ahead specification of the dynamics involved (in which the lagged 
binary dependent variable, lagged predictors and the lagged crisis indicator are 
included) is specified as: 𝑃𝑟𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝜋𝑡) = 𝐹(𝛿𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑡−1𝛽)                               1 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡 = 1) is the conditional probability of banking sector instability given the 
available information at time 𝑡 − 1. 𝑦𝑡−1is the lagged banking sector instability crisis 
binary variable (which takes the value of 1 or 0), 𝑥𝑡−1 is the matrix of lagged 
explanatory variables, 𝜋𝑡−1 is the banking crisis indicator while 𝐹 is the Gaussian 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the dynamic probit model. 
Given the foregoing analysis, three dynamic probit models for each of the six specified 
instances are specified for the assessment of banking sector fragility in the WAMZ. 
These are:  
i. dynamic probit model with lagged value of binary dependent variable (𝑦𝑡−1), in 
addition to the lagged values of the predictors (𝑥𝑡−1) on the right hand side of the 
equation. This gives the assessment of the effects, on the crisis probability, of the 
prevailing previous period regime. This is modelled as: 𝑃𝑟𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝜋𝑡) = 𝐹(𝛿𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑡−1𝛽)                        2 
ii. dynamic probit model with lagged value of crisis indicator (𝜋𝑡−1), in addition to 
the lagged values of the explanatory variables (𝑥𝑡−1) on the right hand side of the 
equation. This linearly transmits the enormousity of the indicator to the next 
period, thereby demonstrating the appropriate effects on the banking sector 
crisis probability. This is modelled as: 𝑃𝑟𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝜋𝑡) = 𝐹(𝛿𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡−1𝛽)                         3 
iii. dynamic probit model incorporating on the right hand side of the equation both 
lagged value of the dependent variable (𝑦𝑡−1) and the lagged value of the crisis 
indicator(𝜋𝑡−1), further to the lagged values of the independent variables (𝑥𝑡−1). 
This is modelled as: 𝑃𝑟𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝜋𝑡) = 𝐹(𝛿𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑡−1𝛽)                             4 
The issue of satisfying the stationarity condition is crucial in the estimation of Equations 
3 and 4 since 𝛿 is an autoregressive parameter. The implementation of the constrained 
MLE will solve this problem. Generally, a log likelihood function is expressed thus: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿(𝜃) = ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑇𝑡=1 (𝜃) = ∑ [𝑦𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐹(𝜋𝑡(𝜃)) + (1 − 𝑦𝑡)log (1 − 𝐹(𝜋𝑡(𝜃))]            5 
At this point, it is important to state at this research work employs a panel data analysis 
approach dynamic probit model (population-averaged) estimation of banking fragility 
in the WAMZ by pooling the available macroeconomic and banking system information 
in the six WAMZ countries. Consequently, the three dynamic panel binary choice probit 
model of banking crisis estimated are expressed in Equations 6 to 8 below: 𝑃𝑟𝑡−1(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛿𝜋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡), (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 0,1,2, … 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑁)    6   𝑃𝑟𝑡−1(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛿𝜋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡), (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 0,1,2, … 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑁)   7 𝑃𝑟𝑡−1(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛿𝜋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡), (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 0,1,2, …𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑁)   8   
 where 𝑇 is the number of time series observations for each country being investigated; 𝑁 is the number of the WAMZ countries being assessed; 𝜂𝑖  is the time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity (random effects) between the countries being examined; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is a time varying error terms. The log likelihood (concentrated likelihood) of the models 
in Equations 6 to 8 could generally be given as: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿(𝜃, 𝜂𝑖 = ∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 (𝜃, 𝜂𝑖) = ∑ ∑ [𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑖=1 log(𝐹𝑖𝑡)𝑁𝑖=1 + (1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡)log (1 − 𝐹𝑖𝑡)        9 
where is 𝜃 the vector of parameters. 
Many empirical literatures have established that the use of panel data approach in a 
study of systemic banking sector crisis is advantageous because of the rare nature of 
banking sector crisis. In a study of the prediction of the US recession, Kauppi and 
Saikkonen (2005) show that dynamic probit models outperform the static probit 
models and that dynamic models with lagged values of the binary response are more 
superior to models in which dynamics were affected only through lagged probit 
probability. In spite of the benefit of exploiting information from several time series and 
obtaining the parameter estimate of 𝛽 which is more precise and reliable, when a panel 
data approach is used in econometric analysis, a major flaw is the imposition of false 
restriction in which 𝛽 is seen as common for all countries under examination.  
In the dynamic panel probit model, there are complication in the application of standard 
probit model is the presence of individual effect in the panel data. There would be 
increases in the number of error terms parameters as the number of countries under 
investigation increases and there cannot be consistent estimation of this for a fixed  
time period, thus necessitating  the application of the panel probit model estimator in 
the estimation process.  
In sum, with the population averaged dynamic probit regression of banking crisis 
indicators and macroeconomic and banking sector variables of the WAMZ countries, 
banking fragility probability is calculated with the estimated coefficient generated by 
the results of the dynamic probit model regression. This makes the probability of 
banking sector instability to be a non-linear function of the identified/ selected banking 
sector crisis indicators as well as other macroeconomic/banking sector variables. 
5 Findings and Results 
The descriptive statistics the macroeconomic, banking sector  and institutional 
variables applied by this chapter on banking fragility and stability in the WAMZ at their 
averages, variability and maximum and minimum values over the period covered by the 
study are exhibited in Table 2 below. Growth in the banking sector domestic credit has 
the highest degree of volatility of 177 as well as the highest average of 114.07, followed 
by the foreign liability/GDP ratio of 148.05. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic, Banking Sector and Institutional Variables of 
Banking Fragility/Stability in the WAMZ 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Macroeconomic Variables: 
GDP Growth 
Inflation 
Nominal Exchange Rate Depreciation 
Short term Real Interest Rates 
M2/International Reserve Ratio 
Unemployment Rates 
Budget Surplus/GDP Ratio 
Money Supply Growth 
Money Market Rates 
 
Banking Sector Variables: 
Bank Deposit/Loan Ratio 
Bank Liquid Reserve/Asset Ratio 
Non-performing Loan/Gross Loan Ratio 
Bank Capital/Assets Ratio 
Z Scores 
Domestic Credit Growth 
Domestic Credit/GDP Ratio 
Foreign Liability/GDP Ratio 
Private Credit/GDP Ratio ∆Private Credit/Deposit Ratio ∆Deposit Liabilities/GDP Ratio ∆Private Credit/GDP Ratio ∆Gross Foreign Liabilities/GDP Ratio 
Lending Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Interest Rates Spread 
Return on Equity 
 
Institutional Variables: 
Governance - Rule of Law 
Governance - Regulatory Quality 
Governance - Political Instability 
 
3.24 
20.17 
21.93 
3.60 
9.05 
5.73 
-3.84 
27.33 
15.89 
 
 
58.71 
18.71 
16.52 
13.69 
5.78 
47.76 
9.42 
114.07 
9.18 
1.82 
6.80 
4.64 
1.25 
22.59 
12.92 
8.85 
28.21 
 
 
-0.79 
-0.65 
-0.79 
 
12.46 
26.56 
46.37 
18.45 
24.90 
2.35 
3.11 
12.43 
6.73 
 
 
26.82 
6.63 
7.48 
4.73 
2.85 
177.87 
6.38 
148.05 
6.34 
27.44 
25.96 
23.26 
27.19 
8.41 
7.56 
6.66 
18.86 
 
 
0.55 
0.46 
0.86 
 
-51.03 
-10.0 
-18.47 
-96.87 
0.36 
3.20 
-14.85 
1.32 
3.54 
 
 
17.15 
5.56 
3.24 
1.50 
-4.14 
-100.14 
1.54 
1.94 
1.54 
-39.80 
-67.88 
-59.87 
-85.06 
8.43 
2.0 
-24.76 
0.94 
 
 
-1.52 
-1.38 
-2.19 
 
106.28 
165.59 
321.90 
33.46 
230.02 
10.40 
3.50 
57.78 
32.42 
 
 
184.48 
31.07 
37.90 
22.50 
10.95 
1782.9 
38.39 
88.21 
38.35 
257.55 
165.71 
86.60 
112.49 
62.83 
54.67 
23.46 
74.27 
 
 
0.11 
0.13 
0.18 
        Source: EIU WDI and IMF Databases and Author's Estimations 
Instances of banking sector crisis in the WAMZ are determined applying the five 
definitions of banking system fragility/stability employed in this study. When 'banking 
crisis' is defined by the four-factor banking crisis dummy, information exhibited in 
Table 3 below shows when the each WAMZ countries, on annual basis experienced 
banking sector crisis between 1980 and 2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Instances of Banking System Stability/Fragility in the WAMZ – 
( 4-factor Banking Crisis Dummy) 
Dependent Variable: Bank Crisis Dummy of the IMF (4 Factors) 
Year Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
     Source: Author's estimations 
Guinea and Liberia lack the necessary information needed for some years between 1980 
and 1997 as revealed by the table. Interest is placed in the Nigerian banking system 
which witnessed instability between 1991 and 1995, and again, between 2009 and 
2013. As earlier noted in this chapter, the stability (or otherwise) of the Nigerian 
banking sector is paramount and has crucial implications for overall banking sector of 
the proposed WAMZ, given the country's banking strength and presence across  the 
whole sub-continent. Furthermore, there were other narrowed-down definitions of  
banking system fragility/stability in the WAMZ, closely similar to the CAMEL (a 
common acronym of banking stability evaluation) that signify the status of banking 
system in the six WAMZ countries over various periods of evaluation.  
Table 8.4: Instances of Banking System Stability/Fragility in the WAMZ - Capitalisation 
Dependent Variable: Bank Capital/Assets Ratio 
Year Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
Fragile 1 
 
Source: Author's estimations 
Note: A banking system is defined as 'fragile' when its Bank Capital/Assets Ratio is below threshold of 8% (the Basel II 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) benchmark of the Bank for International Settlement); and 'stable' if otherwise. *The 
Gambia, Guinea and Liberia were dropped due to non-availability (na) of enough data. 
Table 4 above shows that when adequate capitalisation of banks in the WAMZ countries 
are examined in consideration of the capital adequacy ratio of 8% benchmark in line 
with the BASEL II provisions of the BIS, the three countries considered reported some 
years of fragility as well as stability as there are strong indications that between 2000 
and 2013, banking sector of Ghana and Sierra Leone were grossly fragile due to 
undercapitalisation. This raises some serious question concerns when the banks' 
undercapitalisation (and subsequent recapitalisation problems leading to national fiscal 
problem in the Eurozone) is brought into cognisance. The Nigerian banking sector was 
staggering in-between fragility and stability. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Instances of Banking System Stability/Fragility in the WAMZ - Asset Quality 
Dependent Variable: Non-performing Loans/Gross Loan Ratio  
Year Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
na 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
na 
na 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
 
Source: Author's estimations 
Note: A banking system is defined as 'fragile' when its Non-performing Loan/Gross Loan Ratio is above the 3-WAMZ 
country average of 17.21 plus 2 standard deviation threshold over the periods of banking system stability reported by the 
IMF; and 'stable' if otherwise.*The Gambia, Guinea and Liberia were dropped due to non-availability (na) of enough 
data. The statuses of the three WAMZ countries’ stability in the asset quality measurement of 
banking sector fragility/stability are expressed in Table 5 above. The Ghanaian banking 
sector displays more stability here, while the banking sectors in Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone had almost equal proportion of banking stability and fragility. This is an 
indication that the banking sectors in the two countries (particularly in Nigeria) need to 
look into the problem of non-performing loan within their loan portfolios towards 
increasing banking sector confidence and the chance of survival within the proposed 
currency union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Instances of Banking System Stability/Fragility in the WAMZ - Liquidity  
(Credit/Deposit Ratio) 
Dependent Variable: Bank Credit/Bank Deposit Ratio  
Year Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
  
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
na 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
  
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
Note: A banking system is defined as 'fragile' when its Bank Credit/Deposit Ratio is above the WAMZ countries' zonal 
average of 59.20 plus 2 standard deviation threshold over the periods of banking system stability reported by the IMF; 
and 'stable' if otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Instances of Banking System Stability/Fragility in the WAMZ – Liquidity  
(Liquid Reserves/Assets Ratio) 
Dependent Variable: Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets Ratio  
Year Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
  
Source: Author's estimations 
Note: A banking system is defined as 'fragile' when its Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets Ratio is below the 4-WAMZ country 
average of 17.05 less 2 standard deviation threshold over the periods of banking system stability reported by the IMF; 
and 'stable' if otherwise. * Guinea and Liberia were dropped due to non-availability (na) of enough data. 
The results of the two measures of 'banking sector liquidity' are expressed in Tables 6 
and 7 above. For the results of credit/deposit ratio measure shown in Table 6, the 
dangerous indication is that the Nigerian banking sector is characterised by fragility for 
almost all the period covered in the evaluation, while the banking sector of The Gambia, 
Liberia, and Guinea had more periods of stability. The Ghanaian banking sector was 
fragile in the last year of the period covered. Again, the status of Nigerian banking sector 
should call for concern towards having a positively sustainable bank credit/bank 
deposit match, increasing the level of its bank deposits and reducing the level of credits 
offered. The reflection of the banking sector fragility/stability status as explained by the 
second measure of liquidity are highlighted in Table 7 where The Gambian and the 
Ghanaian banking sectors exhibited some high levels of banking system fragility. The 
application of Bank Z Score of solvency and probability of default shows in Table 8 
below that all the banking six banking sectors within the WAMZ are stable, though the 
Nigerian banking sector still exhibit signs of insolvency in 2009 and 2010. Overall, these 
trends in the Z Scores signify positive implications for the confidence in the banking 
sectors of the proposed currency union.  
 
 
Table 8: Instances of Banking System Stability/Fragility in the WAMZ 
(Bank Solvency/Probability of Default) 
Dependent Variable: (Bank Z Score) 
Year Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
 
na 
na 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
na 
na 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
 
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable  
Stable   
Source: Author's estimations 
Note: A banking system is defined as 'fragile' when its Z score is below the threshold of 2.0 (the mid-point between the 
extremes of the Altman Z Score Model's Grey Zone of Discrimination); and 'stable' if otherwise. 
Table 9 below reports the summary of fragility and stability under the six instances. The 
table shows the scores by each banking sector ranging between 71% and 100% 
evidence of banking sector stability in the six countries under the instances of banking 
sector solvency and the four-factor analyses. It is vital to state at this point that 
regardless of the percentages scored by a country in a probability study of banking 
fragility like this, ‘fragility’ outcome for a WAMZ country under any of the six 
circumstances of evaluation in this research study denote possible banking instability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     Table 9: Proportions of Banking Fragility and Banking Stability in the WAMZ 
Instance 1 Four-factor 
WAMZ Country % Fragility % Stability 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
0 
0.05 
0.04 
0 
29 
15 
100 
99.95 
99.96 
100 
71 
85 
Instance 2- Bank Capitalisation 
WAMZ Country % Fragility % Stability 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
na 
100 
na 
na 
50 
100 
na 
0 
na 
na 
50 
0 
Instance 3 - Asset Quality 
WAMZ Country % Fragility % Stability 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
na 
13 
na 
na 
44 
43 
na 
87 
na 
na 
56 
57 
Instance 4 - Bank Liquidity (Credit/Deposit) 
WAMZ Country % Fragility % Stability 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
41 
31 
50 
26 
100 
0 
59 
69 
50 
74 
0 
100 
Instance 5 - Bank Liquidity (Liquidity Reserves/Assets) 
WAMZ Country % Fragility % Stability 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
0 
23 
na 
na 
46 
77 
100 
77 
na 
na 
54 
23 
Instance 6 - Bank Solvency and Probability of Default (Bank Z Score) 
WAMZ Country % Fragility % Stability 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.10 
0 
100 
100 
100 
100 
99.1 
100 
    Source: Author’s Estimation 
The outcomes of the dynamic probit model estimations of the panel data of the six 
WAMZ countries, within the context of the six instances of banking sector 
fragility/stability are given in Tables 10 through to Table 16.  
Table 10: Marginal Effects Predictions of Probability of Banking System Fragility in Dynamic Panel 
Probit Models: Four-factor Banking Crisis Dummy (as Dependent Variable) 
Estimation Results of Panel 1: Four-factor Banking Crisis Dummy 
WAMZ Countries in the Panel - The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Liberia, Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone 
Variables Probability Predictions 
Macroeconomic Variables (Lagged): 
Banking Crisis Dummy: 
Real GDP Growth: 
Inflation: 
∆Nominal Exchange Rate: 
∆Gross Foreign Liability/GDP Ratio: 
Real Per Capita Income: 
Money Supply/International Reserve Ratio: 
Short term Real Interest Rate: 
Budget Surplus/GDP Ratio: 
 
Banking Sector Variables (Lagged): 
∆Deposit Liability/GDP Ratio: 
Domestic Credit Growth: 
∆Private Credit/Deposit Ratio 
 
Sample size: 
Wald X2 Prob.: 
 
0.3640* 
0.0013 
-0.0027*** 
-0.0005 
0.0001 
0.0228 
-0.0038*** 
-0.0044** 
0.0013 
 
 
0.0008 
-0.0002** 
0.0001 
 
122 
0.00 
 Source: Author's Estimations and Stata 14 Output 
The estimation results of the model of Panel 1 reported in Table 10 above indicate joint 
significance at 1% level. Most of the macroeconomic variables did not yield the expected 
signs, even at their levels of significance. Theoretically, real GDP growth, real per capita 
income, private credit/deposit ratio variable should be negative. The results show that 
the probability of banking crisis in the WAMZ (in consideration of the four factors) does 
not depend on the insignificant real growth, nominal exchange rate changes, changes in 
gross foreign liabilities/GDP ratios budget surplus ratios, changes in private 
credit/deposit ratio and changes in the deposit liability/GDP ratio. The external 
vulnerabilities in money supply/international reserves ratios affect banking crisis in the 
opposite direction with the implication that a unit increase in this ratio will decrease the 
probability of banking crisis in the WAMZ by around 0.38%. The banking system are not 
vulnerable to real interest rate and inflationary shocks. This is against the theoretical 
hypothesis. Though, these variables are significant, they work in the opposite directions. 
As the domestic credit growth is significant and negative, the result implies that as 
volume of domestic credit declines, banking crisis would likely increase. The lagged 
banking crisis dummy is significant and expectedly positive as explanatory variable, 
meaning that one unit increase in the previous status of banking sector 
stability/fragility has the likelihood of influencing banking crisis by 36%.   
Table 11: Marginal Effects Predictions of Probability of Banking System Fragility in Dynamic Panel 
Probit Models: (Capital Adequacy Ratio as Dependent Variable) 
Estimation Results of Panel 2: Bank Capitalisation 
WAMZ Countries in Panel: Ghana Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
Marginal Effects Predictions of Probability of Banking System Fragility 
Variables Prob. Predictions 
Macroeconomic Variables (Lagged): 
Inflation: 
Real GDP Growth: 
Short Term Real Interest Rates: 
 
Banking Sector Variables (Lagged): 
Capital Adequacy Ratio: 
Bank Z Scores: 
 
Sample size: 
Wald X2 Prob.: 
 
-0.0020 
0.0032 
-0.0025 
 
 
-0.1975 
-0.0343 
 
33 
0.00 
 Source: Author's Estimations and Stata 14 Output 
For the Panel 2 in which inflation, real GDP growth, short term interest rate and bank Z 
score are modelled to explain the probability of the occurrence of banking crisis in the 
context of bank capital adequacy, it is revealed that the probability of banking crisis in 
the WAMZ is not dependent upon these variables as displayed in Table 11 above 
because none of these variables exhibits statistical significance. None of the variables 
produced the expected signs. Although, the estimations, due to the lack of enough data, 
was limited to three WAMZ countries: Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. There is joint 
statistical significance of the variables in the model.  
Table 12: Estimation Coefficients and Probability Predictions Dynamic Panel Probit Models  
(Non-Performing Loan Ratio as Dependent Variable) 
Estimation Results of Panel 3: Asset Quality 
WAMZ Countries in Panel: Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
Marginal Effects Predictions of Probability of Banking System Fragility 
Variables Probability. Predictions 
Macroeconomic Variables (Lagged): 
Inflation: 
Real GDP Growth: 
 
Banking Sector Variables (Lagged): 
Non-Performing Loan/Total Loan Ratio: 
Domestic Credit Growth: 
Lending Rate: 
 
Institutional Variables (Lagged): 
Governance: Rule of Law: 
 
Sample size: 
Wald X 2Prob.: 
 
0.0051*** 
-0.0074 
 
 
0.1670 
-0.0007 
0.0175 
 
 
-0.4378 
 
39 
0.00 
 Source: Author's Estimations and Stata 14 Output 
In Panel 3 results exhibited in Table 11 above, the estimations of banking crisis within 
the 'asset quality' definition show statistical significance and correct signs (positive) for 
inflation, indicating that in this respect, inflation is an indicator of the likelihood of 
banking crisis caused by poor qualities of bank assets (non-performing loans). One unit 
increase in inflation in the WAMZ is likely to trigger such banking crisis by 0.5%. All 
other variables, though reflect the expected signs, do not explain poor-asset-quality-
determined banking crisis in the WAMZ. The model was estimated for the WAMZ 
countries due to lack of enough data for The Gambia, Guinea and Liberia.   
In Panel 4, there are two dynamic probit models of bank liquidity crisis assessments 
(Models 1 and Model 2), based on the level of bank credit/bank deposit ratio. For Model 
1 in this panel, real GDP growth, inflation, changes in nominal exchange rate and three 
banking sector variables of loan/deposit ratio, lending rate and deposit rate are 
incorporated as explanatory variables. For Model 2 in this same context, all the 
variables in the first model were applied except the nominal exchange rate change 
variable and inflation that are insignificant in the results of the first estimated model. 
The results are displayed in Table 13 below.  
Table 13: Estimation Coefficients and Probability Predictions Dynamic Panel Probit Models 
(Bank Credit/Bank Deposit Ratio as Dependent Variable) 
Estimation Results of Panel 4: Bank Liquidity (1) 
WAMZ Countries in Panel: The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone 
Marginal Effects Predictions of Probability of Banking System Fragility 
Variables Model 1 
Probability 
Predictions 
Model 2 
Probability 
Predictions 
Macroeconomic Variables (Lagged): 
Real GDP Growth: 
Inflation: 
∆Nominal Exchange Rate: 
 
Banking Sector Variables (Lagged): 
Loans/Depositors Ratio: 
Lending Rate: 
Deposit Rate: 
 
Sample size: 
Wald X2Prob.: 
 
0.0041*** 
-0.0013 
-0.0003 
 
 
0.4032* 
-0.0143** 
0.0147*** 
 
163 
0.00 
 
0.0041*** 
 
 
 
 
0.4060* 
-0.0146** 
0.0140*** 
 
163 
0.00 
 Source: Author's Estimations and Stata 14 Output 
In the two models, real GDP growth, and all the three banking sector variables are 
significant. The emphasis here is placed on the significant banking sector variables. 
From the theoretical position, lending rates and deposit rates work in the same 
direction as well as having the same effects on the liquidity ratio of banking crisis 
measurement in Panel 4 (Table 13). While increase in lending rate discourages bank 
customers from taking more credits and thereby lowers the level of bank credits, same 
measure of increase in deposit rates encourages bank customers to increase their 
savings and deposits, thereby increasing banks' deposit bases. Increase in lending rates 
positively influences the level of banks' liquidity (reducing effects on bank loans levels), 
just as increases in deposit rates would also have positive effects on banks' liquidity 
levels (increasing effects on bank deposits levels). Given these opposing effects on the 
ratio's numerator (bank loans) and denominator (bank deposits), lending rate (with its 
'reducing' effects) is expected to yield negative signs while deposit rate (with its 
'increasing' effects) should show positive signs. Consequently upon these, the results of 
the two models in Panel 4 is a reflection of these banking sector variables yielding the 
correct signs and are statistically significant. When the change in nominal exchange rate 
is included in Model 1 (of Panel 4), a unit increase in the lending rates and deposit rates 
each have 1.4% probability of propelling banking liquidity crisis in the WAMZ. When the 
insignificant inflation and nominal exchange rate change were deleted from Model 1, 
these banking sector variables, still significant at the same levels (with expected signs) 
yield same results in Model 2 of Panel 4 (as in Model 4 of same panel). The one-period 
lagged liquidity level binary response variable of bank liquidity crisis in this context 
shows the likelihood of the past liquidity position leading to new bank liquidity crisis at 
40%. The two models show joint statistical significance at 1% level of significance. It is 
significant to note that Panel 4 estimations fully encompass all the six WAMZ countries 
and that all the variables of interest are statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Estimation Coefficients and Probability Predictions Dynamic Panel Probit Models 
(Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets Ratio as Dependent Variable) 
Estimation Results of Panel 5: Bank Liquidity (2) 
WAMZ Countries in Panel: The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
Marginal Effects Predictions of Probability of Banking System Fragility 
Variables Probability Predictions 
Macroeconomic Variables (Lagged): 
Real GDP Growth: 
Inflation: 
Money Market Rates 
 
Banking Sector Variables (Lagged): 
Bank Liquid Reserves/Asset Ratios: 
Net Interest Margin: 
 
Institutional Variables (Lagged): 
Governance: Political Instability: 
 
Sample size: 
Wald X2 Prob.: 
 
-0.0088 
0.0024 
-0.0801 
 
 
-0.0248 
-0.0514** 
 
 
0.0070 
 
43 
0.23 
 Source: Author's Estimations and Stata 14 Output 
The Panel 5 results of the bank liquidity crisis determination in the context of second 
measure of bank liquidity in which bank liquid reserves/assets ratio proxies as the 
indicator is expressed in Table 14 above. Money market rates fail to exhibit the correct 
sign; and low levels of economic growth and inflation in the WAMZ are not associated 
with bank liquidity crisis in this context. The previous period level of bank liquidity is 
negatively related to current liquidity crisis. For net interest margin of banks, the result 
portends that within the WAMZ's banking sectors, decrease in net interest margin by 
one unit increases the likelihood of banking fragility by 5%. The model estimation however, fails the joint significant test at χ2 probability value of 0.23, thus giving way to 
the preference of the estimation results in Table 13 of the earlier model of liquidity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Estimation Coefficients and Probability Predictions Dynamic Panel Probit Models  
(Bank Z Score as Dependent Variable) 
Estimation Results of Panel 6: Bank Solvency/Probability of Default 
WAMZ Countries in Panel: The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone 
Marginal Effects Predictions of Probability of Banking System Fragility 
WAMZ Countries in Panel: The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone 
Variables Probability Predictions 
Macroeconomic Variables (Lagged): 
Real GDP Growth: 
Inflation: 
Money Market Rates: 
 
Banking Sector Variables (Lagged): 
Bank Z Scores: 
Domestic Credit Growth: 
Commercial Bank Assets: 
 
Sample size: 
Wald X2: 
 
-0.0036 
-0.0045 
-0.0089*** 
 
 
0.5199* 
-0.0010 
-0.03127 
 
61 
0.00 
 Source: Author's Estimations and Stata 14 Output 
The outcomes of the bank solvency/probability of default crisis for Panel 6 are 
presented in Table 15 above where it shows that only money market rate (with an 
unexpected sign) and lagged binary outcome values of bank Z scores are significant. 
Real growth, inflation, domestic credit growth and commercial bank assets are not 
significant indicators of banking sector solvency and default crisis in the WAMZ, just as 
the previous status of default/solvency has 52% likelihood of contributing to new 
solvency crisis. Domestic credit growth could not, in this context, serve as a determinant 
of banking crisis given its insignificance and incorrect signs. Commercial bank assets 
(made up of values owned by the banking sector) generates the correct negative signs 
but is insignificant suggesting that solvency crisis in the WAMZ in the WAMZ banking 
sector is not dependent on this variable, though a unit change in the variable may 
reduce the likelihood of banking solvency crisis by 3%. 
Further to the results of the five-panel-data estimations of dynamic probit models for 
the banking sectors in the WAMZ, Figures 1 below displays the plots of average 
marginal effects for the estimations of each models in the five panels, at 95% confidence 
levels. These plots reflect the effects of each response variables employed in the models 
in each panel, on the probability of the WAMZ's banking sector turning from stability to 
fragility under the five definitions of banking sector crisis applied in this study.   
 
Figure 1: Plots of Average Marginal Effects of Banking Fragility/Stability Assessments in the WAMZ 
Four-factor Banking Crisis Dummy: 
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Conclusions 
Given the necessity of banking sector stability for the viability of monetary integration 
of a geographic bloc (as exposed by the financial crisis), this study built dynamic panel 
data probit models to estimate the trends of stability (or fragility) of banking systems 
across the WAMZ based on five possible instances: (i) IMF-generated banking crisis 
dummy (ii) non-performing loans, (iii) bank capital inadequacy, (iv) illiquidity, (v) poor 
Z-score. All relative explanatory variables in the dynamic probit models were lagged by 
one or more period in order to avoid the potential problem endogeneity problems in the 
contemporaneous explanatory variables and make explanatory variables to be leading 
indicators in banking sector fragility prediction.  
The study noted the stability (or otherwise) of the Nigerian banking sector as 
paramount, conveying crucial implications for overall banking sector of the proposed 
WAMZ, given the country's banking strength and presence across  the whole sub-
continent. Nigerian banking system witnessed instability between 1991 and 1995, and 
between 2009 and 2013 in the dynamic probit estimation of banking crisis dummy.  
With the BASEL II capital adequacy ratio of 8% of the BIS as benchmark, The Gambia, 
Guinea and Liberia were not included in the capitalisation consideration of banking 
fragility due to inavailability of enough data. From the estimation results, there are 
strong indications that between 2000 and 2013, banking sector of Ghana and Sierra 
Leone were grossly fragile due to undercapitalisation. This raises some serious question 
concerns when the banks' undercapitalisation (and subsequent recapitalisation 
problems leading to national fiscal problem in the Eurozone) is brought into cognisance. 
The Nigerian banking sector was staggering in-between fragility and stability. The asset 
quality tests of banking fragility reveal that the Ghanaian banking sector displays more 
stability here, while the banking sectors in Nigeria and Sierra Leone had almost equal 
proportion of banking stability and fragility.  
Bank Credit/Bank Deposit and Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets ratios are the two 
measures of bank liquidity levels employed in this study. The results of the bank liquid 
reserve/assets ratio instance of bank fragility estimations is jettisoned because of the 
statistical insignificance of the banking sector independent variables applied in the 
estimation as well as the comparatively lower number observations. The credit/deposit 
ratio liquidity tests of banking sector fragility suggest the dangerous indication is that 
the Nigerian banking sector is characterised by fragility for almost all the period 
covered in the evaluation, calling for concern. The banking sector of The Gambia, 
Liberia, and Guinea had more periods of stability. The Ghanaian banking sector was 
fragile in the last year of the period covered.  
The Bank Z Score of solvency and probability of default tests suggest that all the banking 
six banking sectors within the WAMZ are stable, though the Nigerian banking sector 
exhibits signs of insolvency in 2009 and 2010. On the overall, these trends in the Z 
Scores signify positive implications for the confidence in the banking sectors of the 
proposed currency union.  
Generally, going through the outcomes of the probability tests of banking fragility 
across the WAMZ, banking systems within the zone portend moderate stability which 
gives assurance of a stable monetary integration of the WAMZ for now. 
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